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EXCLUSION OF FAMILIES WITH 
CHILDREN FROM HOUSING 
For most of this century the middle-class American dream has 
centered on the family and the home. Traditionally, couples 
married young and intended to have children; they began their 
married lives in apartments or in modest single-family homes. 
Familial prosperity was expected to keep pace with pregnancies 
as the families moved into ever larger homes in ever more afflu-
ent areas. 
However much that image may once have reflected the com-
mon middle-class American experience, today it represents only 
one of several family and housing patterns. 1 A variety of social 
and economic phenomena, including changes in the role of 
women, a rising divorce rate, greater mobility, and higher inter-
est rates for mortgages, has contributed to this change. 2 At the 
same time, another phenomenon has become more prevalent: 
the exclusion of families with children from housing. 3 
Although the gravity of the exclusionary practice varies with 
the availability of housing in any given geographical area, statis-
1. See A. DOWNS, RENTAL HOUSING IN THE 1980's 3 (1983) (projecting the market for 
rental housing during the rest of the decade); R. GOETZE, RESCUING THE AMERICAN DREAM 
4 (1983) (discussing housing in general). 
2. See R. GOETZE, supra note 1, at 4-7 (discussing changes in demographics of home 
ownership). 
3. Many commentators have addressed this topic. Recent discussion has centered on 
an interesting group of California cases. See infra text accompanying notes 132-40. See, 
e.g., Dunaway & Blied, Discrimination Against Children in Rental Housing: A Califor-
nia Perspective, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 21 (1979) (discussing applicability of California 
Civil Rights Act to rental housing); O'Brien & Fitzgerald, Apartment for 
Rent-Children Not Allowed: The Illinois Children in Housing Statute-Its Viability 
and a Proposal for its Comprehensive Amendment, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 64 (1975) (ana-
lyzing current Illinois law and proposing an amendment); Travalio, Suffer the Little 
Children-But Not in My Neighborhood: A Constitutional View of Age-Restrictive 
Housing, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 295 (1979) (applying federal constitutional law to questions of 
age-exclusive housing); Note, Why Johnny Can't Rent: An Examination of Laws 
Prohibiting Discrimination Against Families in Rental Housing, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1829 
(1981) (seminal Note discussing child discrimination as one facet of a general housing 
shortage) [hereinafter cited as Note, Why Johnny Can't Rent]; Note, Housing Discrimi-
nation Against Children: The Legal Status of a Growing Social Problem, 16 J. FAM. L. 
559 (1977) (discussing history of topic) [hereinafter cited as Note, Housing 
Discrimination]. 
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tics show that exclusionary policies potentially affect millions of 
people. Until recently, only a few states had established any pol-
icy on this type of exclusion.4 Because market forces controlled 
the situation, landlords asserted without any supporting evi-
dence the need to exclude children from their housing units. 11 
Meanwhile, families in some areas waited for months before 
finding any affordable housing.6 
The dilemma suggests no easy answer. One cannot dismiss out 
of hand the economic interests of landlords or the privacy inter-
ests of families. Moreover, landlords do not stand alone in their 
opposition to the presence of children; indeed, many potential 
neighbors of currently excluded families demand the right . to 
continue living in adults-only neighborhoods. Among those ob-
jecting to the presence of children, the elderly as a class most 
strongly assert a need to live in a neighborhood without chil-
dren. 7 Any solution must respect all these interests. 
Historically, child-exclusion policies have most frequently af-
fected apartment dwellers. Nevertheless, recent changes in hous-
ing trends have drawn other types of housing into the contro-
versy. 8 Because they are often structurally similar to 
apartments, condominiums have received a large amount of legal 
attention.9 Furthermore, the presence of large numbers of eld-
erly people has contributed to efforts to exclude children from 
mobile home parks.10 'Finally, although private homes have re-
4. See infra text accompanying notes 111-30. 
5. See, e.g., CBS News, Adults Only, 60 MINUTES (June 17, 1984) [hereinafter cited 
as CBS News, Adults Only]; CBS News, No Kids Allowed, 60 MINUTES (July 30, 1978) 
[hereinafter cited as CBS News, No Kids Allowed]. 
6. See CBS News, Adults Only, supra note 5; CBS News, No Kids Allowed, supra 
note 5; R. GOETZE, supra note 1, at 45. The rental market in California is so tight that 
some families seek shelter in residential hotels and motels. Predictably, they are exper-
iencing exclusion in that sector and are pursuing legal remedies. See CAL. DEP'T OF FAIR 
EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING, ADDENDUM TO DIRECTIVE 22, Feb. 1, 1985. 
7. See, e.g., Doyle, Retirement Communities: The Nature and Enforceability of Res-
idential Segregation by Age, 76 M1cu. L. REV. 64 (1977) (discussing the constitutionality 
of retirement communities reserved exclusively for the elderly); Travalio, supra note 3. 
8. See R. GOETZE, supra note 1; see infra text accompanying notes 23-35. 
9. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 
191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983) (holding that condominium associations could not exclude par-
ents with children from their condominiums), rev'g 132 Cal. App. 3d 178, 183 Cal. Rptr. 
111 (1982); Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1977) (holding that condominium 'associations could not exclude families with chil-
dren), aff'd on other grounds, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979) (holding that condominium 
associations may exclude families with children, as long as they treat all tenants fairly). 
10. See, e.g., Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974) (holding that 
residents could enforce a covenant forbidding minor children in a mobile home park); 
Adamson Cos. v. Zipp, 163 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 210 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1984) (holding that 
adults-only provision of mobile home lease violated California civil rights act). 
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mained comparatively free of such regulation, some private 
housing developments have recently begun to enforce child-ex-
clusion policies. 11 
Excluded families seeking federal protection have met with 
little success.12 States, however, have taken a variety of positions 
on this issue. Nine states have enacted statutory measures ex-
plicitly prohibiting the exclusion of children from housing. 13 Al-
though none of the remaining jurisdictions have enacted statutes 
specifically addressing this matter, courts in two of these states 
have applied provisions in state civil or human rights statutes to 
the question. One of these states, California, 14 forbade the prac-
tice of child exclusion, while the other, Michigan,16 permitted it. 
Nevertheless, the majority of the states have yet to address the 
problem.16 
This Note attempts to resolve the most significant problems 
raised by discrimination against children in housing. Part I 
briefly analyzes the prevalence of child exclusion in different 
types of housing. It also provides a statistical analysis of the 
rental housing market to enable the reader to gauge the extent 
of the problem in one type of housing. Part II discusses policy 
arguments supporting both those who seek to exclude children 
11. See Frank, Must Baby Go?, 70 A.BA J., July 1984, at 30; Frank, Move, Family 
Told, 71 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 33 [hereinafter cited as Frank, Move]. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 86-110. 
13. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-303, -1317 (Supp. 1984-1985); CAL. Civ. CODE § 51.2 
(West Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 46a-64a (West 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, 
§ 6503 (Supp. 1984); Human Rights Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 3-104 (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1984-1985); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 1518, § 4(11) (Michie/Law. Coop. Supp. 1982); 
MINN. STAT. §§ 363.02-.03 (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-101 (West Supp. 1984-1985); 
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 236-237 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). 
14. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 
(interpreting state civil rights act to forbid discrimination against children), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 858 (1982). The California Legislature amended the Unruh Civil Rights Act 
with a new section effective January 1, 1985. (CAL. Civ. ConE § 51.2 (West Supp. 1985)). 
The new section reads: 
(a) Section 51 shall be construed to prohibit a business establishment from dis-
criminating in the sale or rental of housing based upon age. Where accommoda-
tions are designed to meet the physical and social needs of senior citizens, a 
business establishment may establish and preserve such housing for senior citi-
. zens .... 
(b) This section is intended to clarify the holdings in Marina Point, Ltd. v. 
Wolfson ... and O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Association .... 
15. Michigan Dep't Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., 421 Mich. 110, 365 N.W.2d 82 
(1984) (interpreting state civil rights act to allow landlord to refuse to make certain 
apartments available to families with children). 
16. One state, Ohio, has adopted a policy allowing landlords to discriminate against 
children. In Lamont Bldg. Co. v. Court, 147 Ohio St. 183, 70 N.E.2d 447 (1946), the Ohio 
Supreme Court held that landlords may confine occupancy of apartments in apartment 
buildings to adults and evict a tenant who brings a child to live in the apartment. 
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and those who advocate government policies forbidding exclu-
sion. Part III then examines the various approaches that states 
have adopted in this area, as well as federal implications of the 
issue. Finally, the Note presents a model statute designed to 
achieve a just accommodation of the interests of all the parties 
involved in this controversy. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The exclusion of families with children from housing primarily 
burdens families who rent apartments. Recent litigation sug-
gests, however, that exclusionary practices occur in all types of 
housing. No statistics exist to indicate the extent to which exclu-
sion affects families. Nevertheless, estimates tend to show that 
millions of families must contend with exclusionary policies. 
A. Scope of the Problem 
Although child exclusion is not a new problem,17 the attention 
the issue has received and the litigation it has spawned have in-
creased dramatically in recent years.1s A shortage of affordable 
housing, which has become acute in some regions,19 has forced 
excluded families to seek judicial assistance in overcoming dis-
criminatory barriers. To aid them in their court fights, many of 
these families have turned to advocates of children's and ten-
ants' rights. 20 Over time these groups have developed expertise 
in the field and have striven to persuade lawmakers to establish 
a coherent policy preventing child exclusion. 21 These two factors, 
a shortage of housing and increasing numbers of well-repre-
sented plaintiffs, have caused the controversy of child exclusion 
to spill over from rental housing into all types of housing. 
Because the exclusion of children from apartments22 best ex-
17. New Jersey passed the first state statute prohibiting housing discrimination 
against children in 1898. L.1898, c. 235, p. 794. 
18. See supra notes 1, 3, 5, and 7. 
19. See, e.g., R. GOETZE, supra note 1, at 11-16; Lowry, Rental Housing in the 1970s: 
Searching for the Crisis, in RENTAL Hous1NG: Is THERE A Ca1s1s? 23 (J. Weicher, K. 
Villani, E. Roistacher, eds. 1981). 
20. These groups include the Fair Housing Project, Santa Monica, Cal.; the National 
Center for Youth Law, San Francisco, Cal.; and the Fair Housing Center, Detroit, Mich. 
21. See, e.g., YOUTH LAW NEWS, published by the National Center for Youth Law. 
22. Throughout"this Note "apartment" refers to a single unit, "apartment building" 
refers to a building containing several apartments, and "apartment complex" refers to a 
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emplifies the general problem, this Note discusses exclusion 
from rental housing. Nevertheless, to formulate a coherent, con-
sistent policy regulating child exclusion, one must examine the 
broad scope of the problem. The following cases demonstrate 
the patchwork approach courts have taken in addressing child-
exclusion issues and thus emphasize the need for uniform legis-
lation covering all types of housing. 
Two state courts have considered the subject of exclusion of 
families from condominiums. The California Supreme Court re-
lied on an earlier decision23 to hold that a condominium owners' 
association may not prohibit a family with children from living 
in a condominium. 24 The Supreme Court of Florida reached the 
same conclusion when it affirmed a lower court's refusal to allow 
a condominium owner to exclude a family with children from its 
condominium.2111rhe Florida court, however, issued a much more 
limited ruling than its California counterpart. It based its hold-
ing on the landlord's unequal application of its policy26 and 
stated that it would not hesitate to uphold an exclusionary pol-
icy that was applied fairly to all residents. 27 
As in the case of condominiums, two state courts have spoken 
on the subject of exclusion from mobile homes. Although an Ari-
zona statute forbids discrimination against children in rental 
housing,28 an appellate court in that state refused to apply the 
statute in a non-rental case and enforced a restrictive covenant 
against parents who lived in a mobile home development with 
their minor children.29 In Adamson Cos. v. Zipp,30 a California 
group of apartment buildings under single ownership or management. 
23. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 132-36. 
24. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 796-97, 663 P.2d 427, 
431, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 324 (1982). 
For the purpose of the decision, the court ruled that the association was the alter ego 
of the condominium developer, and thus fell within the category of business establish-
ments proscribed by the state statute from discriminating in real estate transactions. 
25. White Egret Condominiums, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979), aff'g on 
other grounds, 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
26. Id. at 352. 
27. Id. at 351. The Florida appeals court had relied on federal constitutional deci-
sions-Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (discussing the right to marry); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (discussing the right to marital privacy); Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (discussing the right to procreate)-to establish that ex-
clusion affected areas of privacy that the fourteenth amendment protects. Franklin v. 
White Egret Condominiums, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd on 
other grounds, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979). In a.ffinning the lower court ruling, the state 
supreme court clearly disapproved that court's dicta concerning exclusionary policies. 
379 So. 2d at 351. 
28. AR1z. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-303, -1317 (Supp. 1983-1984). 
29. Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974). The court explicitly re-
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appellate court recently extended its line of cases prohibiting 
child exclusion31 in order to protect families living in mobile 
home developments. In an earlier case,32 the California Supreme 
Court had excepted mobile home parks designed specifically for 
older people from the prohibition against child exclusion. The 
Zipp court did not find the park under consideration to be a 
specialized facility and held that the park could not exclude the 
plaintiff and his family. 33 
Although federal and some state statutes prevent discrimina-
tion in the sale of private homes, no parents had challenged 
their exclusion from housing they had owned previously until a 
family living in an adults-only community in Florida challenged 
the use of a restrictive covenant to evict them from their home 
after the birth of a child. A lower state court ruled that "age 
restrictions are not odious if they are reasonable and are not 
used to prevent people from finding housing."34 It is not surpris-
ing that little exclusion of children has occurred in private 
homes. The notion of age-homogeneous neighborhoods is rela-
tively new,311 and so owners and developers have only recently 
considered excluding families. Moreover, parents did not con-
sider litigating until challenges to exclusionary policies in other 
types of housing became more frequent and more successful. 
fused to address the question that would arise if the owner of property encumbered by a 
restrictive covenant against children attempted to rent his or her property to a family 
with children. 22 Ariz. App. at 227, 526 P.2d at 751. In response, the legislature amended 
the relevant statutes to make it a petty offense to rent to children in violation of a re-
strictive covenant or to rent property to a family with children within an "exclusive 
adult subdivision." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-303(B) (Supp. 1983-1984). At the same 
time, the legislature reduced the penalty for refusing to rent to families with children 
from its earlier punishment of a "first offense by a fine of not less than one hundred nor 
more than five hundred dollars, and for a subsequent conviction by a fine of five hundred 
dollars, by imprisonment for three months in the county jail, or both." ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 33-303 (1974). The current statute treats all violations as petty offenses, ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-303 (Supp. 1984), punishable by fines of not more than three hun-
dred dollars. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-802(0) (1978). 
30. 163 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 210 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1984). 
31. See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 
496, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982); infra text accompanying notes 132-37. See also 
O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790,662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 
(1983); supra text accompanying notes 23-24. 
32. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). 
33. 163 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 210 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1984). 
34. Frank, Move, supra note 11. 
35. See Travalio, supra note 3; Doyle, supra note 7. 
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B. Statistical Background 
No definitive figures exist on the number of families excluded 
from housing because of their children. Because few people as 
yet perceive a problem in non-rental housing,36 no one has un-
dertaken a statistical study of the exclusion of children from 
such housing. Despite its methodological limitations, a study 
sponsored by the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) and performed by the Institute for Social Research 
at the University of Michigan (ISR) addresses the more common 
phenomenon of discrimination in rental housing.37 Relying on a 
random sampling of renters and apartment managers, the report 
considers only instances of outright discrimination and ignores 
subtle cases in which landlords or managers choose to rent to 
single persons or couples in preference to families with chil-
dren. 38 Although it may underestimate the problem, the ISR 
study, along with census figures, suggests the extent of exclusion 
in rental housing. 
The 1980 census found approximately 59 million families in 
the United States, over half of which (30.5 million) include chil-
dren under eighteen and approximately twenty percent of which 
(13 million) include children under six. 39 About 43 million of 
these families live in urban areas; once again, half of these fami-
lies include children under eighteen and about twenty percent 
include children under six.'0 Given an average family size of 2.75 
people,41 these figures indicate that approximately 84 million 
people belong to families containing children under eighteen, 
and approximately 36 million belong to families with children 
under six. 
About forty-four percent (68 million) of all people living in 
non-institutional housing live in rental units,•2 a term which in-
36. See supra text accompanying notes 23-35. 
37. R. MARANS & M. COLTEN, MEASURING RESTRICTIVE RENTAL PRACTICES AFFECTING 
FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN: A NATIONAL SURVEY 66 (1980) (reporting the results of inter-
views with tenants and apartment managers and concluding that child exclusion is be-
coming more common) [hereinafter cited as MARANS]. 
38. Id. at 37. 
39. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
POPULATION, GENERAL Soc1AL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, U.S. SUMMARY, 1-69 [here-
inafter cited as POPULATION CENSUS]. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF HOUSING, CHARACTERISTICS OF Hous-
lNG UNITS, GENERAL Hous1NG CHARACTERISTICS, U.S. SUMMARY, 1-59 [hereinafter cited as 
HOUSING CENSUS]. 
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eludes both single-family houses and multiple-dwelling units.43 
The Bureau of the Census has apparently not correlated this 
percentage of renters with the percentage of people with chil-
dren. As raw figures, however, these data suggest that exclusion-
ary policies affect a large proportion of the population. Although 
several other factors should enter into a definitive statistical 
analysis, if one assumes that the number of people in rental 
housing reflects demographically the population as a whole, then 
half of all renters belong to families with children under eigh-
teen. As a very rough figure, therefore, these policies potentially 
exclude as many as 34 million people from rental housing. 44 
The problem becomes more tangible when one looks at figures 
for a single class of people: single women who head households. 
Such households account for about forty percent of all renters, 
the largest single group. 411 
HOUSEHOLDS HEADED BY WOMEN WITHOUT HusBANDS46 
Total 
With children 
Under 18 
Under 6 
Nationwide 
8.2 million 
4.9 million 
1.7 million 
Urban 
6.8 million 
4.2 million 
1.5 million 
Moreover, female-headed households have less than half the av-
erage income of households in which spouses live together.47 Be-
cause low income decreases a person's flexibility in searching for 
housing, the people comprising this large segment of the popula-
tion must depend on their landlords' continued willingness to 
allow them to live with their children in rented housing. 
The foregoing analysis emphasizes the potential seriousness of 
widespread exclusionary policies. Furthermore, the fact that ap-
proximately one out of every five rental units currently excludes 
families with children adds to the gravity of the problem.48 Fi-
nally, the larger the number of children in a family, the greater 
is the likelihood that the family will be excluded from housing.49 
By preventing them from finding adequate rental housing, the 
43. Id. at B-9. 
44. See generally HOUSING CENSUS, supra note 42. 
45. A. DowNs, supra note 1, at 3. 
46. POPULATION CENSUS, supra note 39, at 1-69. 
47. A. DOWNS, supra note 1, at 3. 
48. MARANS, supra note 37, at ES-2. 
49. Id. 
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policy of excluding families with children primarily burdens 
those families already suffering the economic pressures associ-
ated with large families. 
II. PUBLIC POLICY 
Landlords and tenants who support policies excluding families 
with children rely upon specific instances of children's misbe-
havior or upon the tastes of individual renters to argue for a 
broad freedom to impose restrictions on renting to families. In 
contrast, advocates of unrestricted access to housing point to the 
fallacy of their opponents' characterization of most children as 
annoying. Furthermore, they argue, families looking for housing 
would more than fill vacancies generated by tenants who would 
move rather than be forced to live near children. 
A. Policies Favoring the Exclusion of Children from Rental 
Housing 
Two notions support the exclusion of families with children 
from rental housing. First, because children are boisterous, they 
will annoy other tenants. 60 Second, having children as tenants 
will cost landlords money.61 The two themes are closely interwo-
ven: because children frequently destroy property, they cost 
landlords money in upkeep and insurance, and, partly in re-
sponse to children's objectionable behavior, potential tenants 
choose to live elsewhere, causing landlords either to forego rents 
or else to pay more to advertise and secure new tenants. 62 De-
spite the close relationship between these two factors, one can 
trace the individual strands of the arguments. 
1. Children's offensive behavior- The leading case on child 
exclusion from the early 1970's, Flowers v. John Burnham and 
Co., 63 addressed the argument that landlords have a right to ex-
50. Flowers v. John Burnham & Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 703, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644, 645 
(1971) (permitting exclusion of boys over five because of their "independence, mischie-
vousness, boisterousness and rowdyism"). 
51. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 729, 640 P.2d 115, 119, 180 Cal. 
Rptr. 496, 501, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982); Michigan Dep't of Civil Rights v. 
Beznos Corp., 125 Mich. App. 500, 504-05, 336 N.W.2d 494, 496 (1982), atf'd, 421 Mich. 
110, 365 N.W.2d 82 (1984). 
52. CBS News, Adults Only, supra note 5. 
53. 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1971). 
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elude certain classes of tenants because of an expectation that 
such tenants will engage in undesirable conduct. The appellate 
court upheld a landlord's exclusion of boys over five from his 
apartments, finding that "the independence, mischievousness, 
boisterousness and rowdyism of children vary by age and sex," 
and that "regulating tenants' ages and sex to that extent is not 
unreasonable or arbitrary."G• 
As a threshold matter, one should note that the Flowers court 
required no evidence that any tenants actually objected to the 
presence of particular children, but instead held that the effu-
sive behavior of children in general justified their exclusion from 
an apartment complex. Precisely because the court relied on 
group characteristics to exclude individuals, the California Su-
preme Court subsequently overruled Flowers,H maintaining that 
"[e]ven a true generalization about [a] class is an insufficient 
reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generaliza-
tion does not apply."118 Despite the California Supreme Court's 
position, however, other states need not forbid owners from en-
gaging in these group generalizations. G7 
Of course, some tenants do in fact respond negatively to the 
presence of any children, often voicing aesthetic concerns. 68 
Other tenants may raise more serious objections to the presence 
of children and adolescents. Especially when individual children 
have engaged in acts of vandalism, landlords and other tenants 
may generalize from that behavior and exclude people whom 
they perceive as potential troublemakers. 119 
In addition to the problem of generalization, the variety of 
54. Id. at 703, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 645. 
55. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 738-39, 640 P.2d 115, 125, 180 Cal. 
Rptr. 496, 507 (holding that such selection is arbitrary and illegal), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
858 (1982). 
56. Id. at 740, 640 P.2d at 127, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 508 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of 
Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978) (emphasis omitted)). 
57. The California legislature and California Supreme Court protect an extremely 
broad range of classes under their equal protection guarantees. See the discussion of 
protected classes in Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d. 721, 730-36, 640 P.2d 115, 
120-24, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 502-06, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). Not every state will 
draft or interpret its constitution and statutes so broadly. 
58. "The noise and laughter of children at play may be music to the ears of their 
parents and others who are kindly disposed toward children. That noise, laughter and 
occasional boisterousness, however, can be greatly disturbing to those not so favorably 
disposed." O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 132 Cal. App. 3d 178, 183 Cal. Rptr. 
111, 117-18 (1982), rev'd, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983). 
59. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 727-28, 640 P.2d 115, 118, 180 Cal. 
Rptr. 496, 500, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982) (landlord argued that previous young 
tenants had "engaged in annoying or potentially dangerous activities," and that the 
landlord was therefore justified in excluding families with children in the future). 
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people's reactions to the presence of children in housing in-
creases the difficulty in resolving the controversy. At one ex-
treme are those tenants who, without any reason stronger than a 
preference for a particular style of life, wish to live apart from 
children. 60 At the other extreme stand those tenants who have 
suffered some injury, either trivial or serious, and now generalize 
in order to avoid repetitions or even reminders of the injury. De-
spite the difference in the merits of their claims, both of these 
groups will unite to protest any action that allows the presence 
of children in a particular housing area. 
Any analysis of this problem must also address the views of a 
particularly vocal group of tenants-the elderly.61 While some 
authorities question the validity of excluding children from 
housing for the general public,62 a significant number of com-
mentators agree that the elderly have a right to live in communi-
ties reserved for their exclusive use if they so desire. 63 To sup-
port their view, these commentators cite the many social and 
psychological benefits that accrue to the elderly in retirement 
communities.64 In particular, they note that a disproportionately 
high number of crimes committed against the elderly occur in 
the world outside their retirement communities and that adoles-
cents and young adults perpetrate a disproportionate number of 
these crimes. 611 Thus, commentators suggest that segregating the 
elderly from the young will tend to lower the rate at which the 
latter prey on the former.66 . 
60. CBS News, No Kids Allowed, supra note 5; CBS News, Adults Only, supra note 
5. 
61. See Doyle, supra note 7; Travalio, supra note 3. 
62. See Dunaway & Blied, supra note 3; O'Brien & Fitzgerald, supra note 3; 
Travalio, supra note 3; Note, Why Johnny Can't Rent, supra note 3; Note, Housing 
Discrimination, supra note 3. 
63. See generally Doyle, supra note 7 (examining constitutional challenges to retire-
ment communities and concluding that it is constitutionally permissible to exclude the 
young from areas zoned or planned for the elderly); Travalio, supra, note 3; see also 
Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 229, 526 P.2d 747, 753 (1974) (finding the exclusion of 
children from a mobile home park permissible behavior because older adults' "housing 
interests and needs differ from families with children"). 
64. In these communities the. elderly live within a network of friends with similar 
interests who often serve to take the place of friends who have died or moved away. 
Travalio, supra note 3, at 318-19. Removed from the outside world with its pervasive 
work ethic, they can enjoy their retirement without feeling idle or superfluous. Id. Unlike 
most apartment buildings, these communities can provide special physical facilities, such 
as ramps, wide doors, and housing on one floor. Id. 
65. Id. at 319-20. 
66. The segregation may not itself protect the elderly. Rather, a retirement commu-
nity may better afford its residents protection. For example, the neighborhood may be 
more easily patrolled and the building doors more securely guarded. No one, however, 
seems to have raised the counterargument that a high concentration of old people in a 
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Many elderly people also argue that because they have already 
raised their own children, they have the right to live the remain-
der of their lives apart from those of other people.67 This atti-
tude resembles the aesthetic disapproval of tenants that was dis-
cussed earlier.68 To resolve these problems, the law, while 
acknowledging that society generally allows individuals to 
choose particular lifestyles without having to defend their 
choices,69 steps in when these choices interfere with conflicting 
choices made by others. 
2. Economic injury to landlords- Landlords and apartment 
managers may also advocate exclusion. Unlike tenants, however, 
who presumably care only about the quality of their individual 
lives, landlords and managers concern themselves both with the 
physical maintenance of apartment buildings and complexes70 
and with the collective contentment of residents as reflected in 
continued full occupancy. At first sight, one might expect the 
property damage children cause to play an important role in 
landlords' decisions to exclude children. The evidence, however, 
does not support this position. The HUD/ISR survey, which 
solicited apartment managers' reactions to the presence of chil-
dren in their units, found those managers who rented to families 
with children least likely to deem children a problem.71 
Of course one could attribute this finding to the fact that 
those landlords least likely to find children a problem may, in 
turn, choose most frequently to rent to families with children. 
On the other hand, one might instead draw the conclusion that 
once landlords rent to tenants with children they realize that 
children often do not present a problem. Although no conclusive 
evidence exists for either position, a portion of the HUD/ISR 
study bolsters the latter interpretation. 
The study found no basis for the landlords' assumption that 
the presence of children in their apartments leads to increased 
neighborhood may make it more conspicuous and hence more vulnerable to attack. 
67. CBS News, Adults Only, supra note 5. 
68. See supra text accompanying note 58. 
69. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (village has a right to 
define its goals and zone accordingly); cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 
(1977). 
70. When asked to rate difficulties associated with managing apartments, only one 
percent of the managers responding included children on their list. MARANS, supra note 
37, at 66-67. "Managers of buildings or complexes not accepting children are twice as 
likely as managers of buildings and complexes accepting children to view each [ of several 
suggested areas where children might cause trouble] as problematical." Id. at 66. 
71. Id. at 57, 60. See also D. ASHFORD & P. EsTON, THE EXTENT AND EFFECTS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CHILDREN IN HOUSING: A STUDY OF FIVE CALIFORNIA CITIES 36 
(1979). 
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repair costs and increased insurance premiums.72 The study also 
indicated that landlords' views do not represent an accurate as-
sessment of the cost of allowing children as tenants, but rather 
are a facile answer to those parents seeking housing for them-
selves and their families. Landlords combine their assumptions 
about property costs with further assumptions about the con-
cerns and prejudices of their tenants who, they assert, will move 
out if children are allowed to move in. The study found that 
approximately twenty-five percent of those apartment dwellers 
living in housing that excludes children explicitly chose to live 
there because of that exclusionary policy. 73 This significance of 
child exclusion policies to potential tenants suggests that even 
landlords who realize that children present few problems to 
them directly may still choose to exclude children to appease 
their tenants. 74 
Although the arguments up to this point have emphasized the 
harm that children can cause their neighbors or the landlords' 
property, landlords have also raised a number of concerns about 
harm to children.711 In defense of an exclusionary policy, land-
lords have argued that their apartment complexes were designed 
with traffic patterns that did not take into account the presence 
of children. 76 Landlords maintain that they must plan construc-
tion sites and recreation facilities to avoid endangering young 
children or that they must confine children to one portion of a 
large complex to prevent their roaming unattended over danger-
. ous areas.77 Although no court has definitively ruled on the va-
lidity of these arguments, courts in Michigan have ruled in favor 
of landlords asserting the claims. 78 
72. MARANS, supra note 37, at 59. 
73. Id. at 65. 
74. As evidence of this phenomenon, the landlords cite examples of people refusing to 
rent apartments if they believe that children will live nearby. Affidavits of Apartment 
Owners at llb-37b, Defendant-Appellee's Brief and Appendix, Michigan Dep't of Civil 
Rights v. Beznos Corp., Supreme Court No. 71737 (Mich. filed July 30, 1984). The Michi-
gan Court of Appeals accepted this argument in Michigan Dep't of Civil Rights v. Beznos 
Corp., 125 Mich. App. 500, 505, 336 N.W.2d 494, 496 (1983) (finding that to prohibit 
exclusion of children would "force landlords to bear increased economic burdens"), aff'd, 
421 Mich. 110, 365 N.W.2d 82 (1984). 
75. See, e.g., Affidavits of Apartment Owners at Ub-37b, Defendant-Appellee's Brief 
and Appendix, Michigan Dep't of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., Supreme Court No. 
71737 (Mich. filed July 30, 1984). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. See Michigan Dep't of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., Oakland County Circuit 
Court No. 80-202870-CZ (Mich. 1981), aff'd, 125 Mich. App. 500, 336 N.W.2d 494 (1983), 
a{f'd, 421 Mich. 110, 365 N.W.2d 82 (1984). In Beznos, the owner of an apartment com-
plex maintained an adults-only complex and a second complex which admitted families 
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B. Public Policies Opposing the Exclusion of Children from 
Rental Housing 
Opponents of the exclusion of children from rental housing 
often maintain that landlords cannot impose restrictions on chil-
dren who have not themselves harmed anyone.79 The California 
Supreme Court, for example, noted in one case that no concrete 
facts existed regarding the number of children involved in offen-
sive activities to support the plaintiff landlord's worries about 
future misbehavior. 80 In general, landlords' fears of annoying 
and destructive behavior from child tenants appear to be greater 
than reality warrants.81 
Furthermore, the HUD/ISR study results directly conflict 
with the assertion that tenants would never rent or would move 
if forced to live near children. While about seventeen percent of 
tenants currently living in age-restricted apartments would leave 
if children moved into the apartments, eighty-one percent would 
remain.82 Likewise, about seventy-five percent of those partici-
pating in the study did not choose their present apartment on 
the basis of whether or not the landlord had an exclusionary 
policy.83 
Although the twenty percent of tenants who refuse to live 
with children constitute a significant number of renters, they 
represent a small minority when compared with the fifty percent 
of families seeking apartments who claim that they have been 
victims of discrimination.84 Indeed, the fact that the number of 
people seeking rental housing for themselves and their children 
appears to offset the number of people who might move when 
faced with the prospect of young neighbors contradicts the land-
lords' assertion that they would lose tenants if forced to rent to 
families with children. Consequently, a sensible public policy 
with children, but restricted them to one portion of the complex. The Michigan courts 
determined that the landlord's actions did not violate the state's civil rights statute. See 
infra text accompanying notes 141-50. 
79. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 728, 640 P.2d 115, 118, 180 Cal. 
Rptr. 496, 500 (presenting landlord's argument that the misbehavior of other children in 
the past justified the exclusion of a family with a new baby, despite neighbors' assertions 
that the baby caused no problems), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). See also supra 
notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
80. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 728, 640 P.2d 115, 118, 180 Cal. 
Rptr. 496, 500, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). 
81. See supra text accompanying note 72. 
82. MARANS, supra note 37, at 61. 
83. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
84. MARANs, supra note 37, at ES-3. 
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should attempt to avoid this restriction on families' ability to 
rent freely and limit exclusionary policies only to exceptional 
circumstances. 811 
Ill. THE LEGALITY OF EXCLUDING CHILDREN FROM HOUSING 
Although plaintiffs have sought relief from exclusionary poli-
cies under both federal and state laws, federal courts do not ap-
pear to be a successful arena in which to challenge exclusionary 
policies. Plaintiffs have had difficuly satisfying standing require-
ments for constitutional or civil rights actions, and other statu-
tory protections do not appear to apply to families with 
children. 
In contrast, some state laws do expressly prohibit child-exclu-
sion practices. Although those statutes are frequently underuti-
lized, explicit legislation seems the most desirable solution. Ac-
tions under state civil rights acts have led to contradictory and 
confusing results. 
A. Federal Law 
Plaintiffs seeking to challenge the exclusionary practices of 
landlords and property owners under federal law have brought 
constitutional claims based on either due process or equal pro-
tection, or statutory actions under federal civil rights and fair 
housing statutes. Although courts have not yet addressed all the 
issues in these areas, plaintiffs have so far enjoyed only limited 
success. Judging from the rulings courts have made, federal law 
does not appear to present a fruitful avenue for attacking child-
exclusion policies. 
1. The Constitution- The United States Constitution does 
not appear to prohibit the exclusion of children from housing.88 
Only in certain limited circumstances does a plaintiff appear 
able to bring a constitutional challenge against such practices. 
Because other commentators have discussed in detail the broad 
constitutional implications of child exclusion,87 this Note will 
simply summarize and update these arguments. 
85. See supra text accompanying notes 61-69. 
86. Of course, plaintiffs may have more success under provisions in state 
constitutions. 
87. See Doyle, supra note 7; Travalio, supra note 3. 
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To allege that the exclusion of children from a dwelling vio-
lates either due process or equal protection, a plaintiff must first 
satisfy the state action requirement. 88 Because the government 
plays no role in most exclusionary practices,89 most plaintiffs 
name private individuals or corporations as defendants and can-
not therefore pass this threshold requirement. 90 In an excep-
tional case, however, Halet v. Wend Investment Co.,91 the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found state action because the 
landlord, who refused to rent to a family with a child, had an 
unusually interdependent relationship with the county.92 Thus, 
even though most plaintiffs cannot fulfill the state action test, in 
special circumstances like Halet a plaintiff may be able to raise 
a constitutional challenge. 
A plaintiff who meets the state action requirement must then 
assert an infringement of her rights that violates either equal 
protection or due process. To support such an assertion, the 
plaintiff must establish that the government's practice involved 
either a suspect classification or a fundamental right. If the 
plaintiff establishes either of these, a court must strictly scruti-
nize the government's action.93 Because, however, the Supreme 
Court has held that age does not constitute a suspect classifica-
tion,94 children excluded from housing on the basis of their age 
cannot challenge the exclusion with the allegation that they be-
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. If the federal government attempts to discriminate, 
then a plaintiff can challenge its actions under the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
89. See, e.g., In re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the fourteenth 
amendment reaches only state action); cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 
715 (1961) (holding that a state participating in several aspects of the operation of a 
private business satisfies the state action requirement). 
90. If, however, the government passed legislation such as a zoning ordinance that 
excluded children, a plaintiff could satisfy the state action requirement. A judge who 
issues an injunction or awards damages in compliance with a discriminatory restrictive 
covenant might also satisfy the requirement. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
91. 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982). See Case Note, Real Property-Prospective Ten-
ant Denied Housing Because of Adults-Only Policy Has Cause of Action Under Four-
teenth Amendment and Fair Housing Act-Halet v. Wend Investment Co., 672 F.2d 
1305 (9th Cir. 1982), 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 965 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Case Note]. 
92. 672 F.2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir. 1982). Examples of the interdependence included 
the facts that the county owned the land and leased it to Wend; that the county oversaw 
the development of the area and had final approval of the plans; that it controlled the 
use of the buildings and the rent charged; that Wend paid a percentage of the rentals to 
the county; and that Wend had to abide by all the conditions of its lease, which forbade 
racial and religious discrimination. 
93. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). If the 
court should determine that there is no basis for strict scrutiny of the challenged statute, 
then it will ask only whether it is conceivable that the classification bears a rational 
relationship to an end of government that the Constitution does not prohibit. 
94. Id. at 313. 
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long to a protected class. Nevertheless, they might be able to 
invoke strict judicial scrutiny on some other basis. 95 
Decisions provide somewhat more hope for success in a chal-
lenge alleging the violation of a fundamental right. Although the 
Supreme Court held in Lindsey u. Normet96 that access to hous-
ing does not represent a fundamental right, a plaintiff might still 
assert that the exclusion of children violates the right of pri-
vacy.97 Indeed, in Moore u. City of East Cleueland,98 Justice 
Powell's plurality opinion stated that government intrusion on 
choices concerning family living arrangements would trigger a, 
search for a compelling state interest that the discriminatory ac-
tion furthers. 99 The Halet court interpreted this to mean that if 
a lower court found that the challenged adults-only rental policy 
deprived family members of the right to live together, it would 
have to forbid the practice unless it could discover a compelling 
state interest. 100 Thus, to challenge successfully a child-exclusion 
policy on constitutional grounds, a plaintiff must first establish 
state action and then demonstrate that no compelling state in-
terest exists. 
2. Statutes- A number of plaintiffs have challenged child-
exclusion policies under federal statutes, specifically the Fair 
Housing Act101 and sections 1982 and 1983 of the Civil Rights 
Act. 102 No court, however, has definitively decided whether any 
of these statutes protect the rights of families excluded from 
housing because of their children. Instead, plaintiffs have had 
success only where they could establish that the exclusionary 
practices disproportionately discriminated against women or 
minorities. 
In Halet, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's dis-
missal of a complaint filed under section 1983, 103 finding that the 
95. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Although Halet 
lacked standing to raise racial discrimination claims under § 1983 and the fourteenth 
amendment, he clearly has standing to challenge the adults-only policy under § 1983 and 
the fourteenth amendment on the grounds that it violates his right to raise a family and 
discriminates against families with children"). 
96. 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) ("We are unable to perceive in [the Constitution] any con-
stitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality .... "). 
97. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982). 
98. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
99. Id. at 499. 
100. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1310-11 (9th Cir. 1982). 
101. 42 u.s.c. §§ 3601-3631 (1982). 
102. 42 u.s.c. §§ 1982-1983 (1982). 
103. Section 1983 provides in relevant part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 
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landlord's policies arguably infringed upon the plaintiff's right 
to raise a family and discriminated against families with chil-
dren.10• The plaintiff in Halet, however, did not pursue his com-
plaint and no other plaintiff has raised a similar section 1983 
claim. Consequently, the applicability of section 1983 to child 
exclusion remains undecided. One should nevertheless note that 
because section 1983 merely permits a damage action for in-
fringement of constitutional rights, a plaintiff would still have to 
establish state action and the absence of a compelling state 
interest. ioG 
Two recent discrimination cases brought under the Fair Hous-
ing Act106 have presented an intriguing mixture of arguments 
based on child exclusion and racial discrimination. Among other 
claims, the plaintiff in Halet alleged that because blacks and 
Hispanics generally have more children in their families than 
whites, the landlord's exclusionary policy disproportionately af-
fected them in violation of the Fair Housing Act.107 Although 
the district court found that the white plaintiff in Halet had no 
standing to sue, the Ninth Circuit held that the Act's liberal 
standing requirements did grant the plaintiff a cause of 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
104. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1~10-11 (9th Cir. 1982). 
105. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90. 
Plaintiffs have tried to bring suit under § 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982), but because 
the Supreme Court has held that that section applies only to cases of racial discrimina-
tion, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), they have had no success in 
using that provision to challenge child exclusion policies. In Fred v. Kokinokos, 347 F. 
Supp. 942 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), the court squarely addressed a claim under § 1982's provi-
sion that "[A]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State 
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to ... purchase [and] lease ... 
real ... property." The case involved a Puerto Rican family that claimed that their 
landlord, in refusing to rent to them, had discriminated against them on the basis of 
race. The plaintiff alleged race discrimination in his complaint, and the court accepted 
for purposes of argument that ethnic origin could be a racial characteristic. Fred v. Koki-
nokos, 347 F. Supp. at 944. The landlord argued that he had refused to rent not because 
they were Puerto Rican but because too many children would occupy the apartment. 
The court upheld the landlord's limitation on the size of tenant families, finding that 
prejudice against the tenants' nationality had played no part in the landlord's decision. 
Id. As part of the rationale for its holding, the court quoted from Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. 
Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1972), which held that § 1982 did not prevent an owner from 
considering factors other than race when deciding whether to rent to a prospective ten-
ant. Specifically, the court said, "[S]uch factors ... include ... the size of [a tenant's] 
family, the ages of his children .... " Id. at 162. 
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1982). 
107. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 n.6 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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action. 108 
The Fourth Circuit, in Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates, 109 
went beyond Halet's limited standing holding. There, the own-
ers attempted to institute an all-adults policy by forcing those 
residents who had children to move. Because most of the resi-
dents asked to leave were black, the court held that the plain-
tiffs had established a prima facie case of discriminatory impact 
under the Act. 110 Thus, the Fair Housing Act, which requires no 
state action, may afford some relief to minorities subject to child 
exclusion policies. 
B. State Law 
Only a few states currently have statutes expressly addressing 
the housing rights of families with children; none of these laws, 
however, is fully satisfactory. Yet the inconclusive experiences of 
those states that have attempted to solve the problem through 
judicial interpretation of general civil rights statutes suggest 
that a specific statute addressing the rights of all parties is the 
most desirable solution. An analysis of current state laws and 
their faults, as well as of judicial decisions, indicates areas in 
which a model statute can improve existing law. 
1. State statutes forbidding the exclusion of children-
Nine states have to date enacted statutes expressly forbidding 
discrimination against families with children. 111 Although these 
statutes address the problem of discrimination against families, 
tenants have rarely used them.112 Both the public's lack of 
awareness of these statutes and the difficulties involved in pur-
suing a remedy have contributed to this underuse. Not until leg-
islatures remove these obstacles will landlords abandon their 
discriminatory practices. The following section describes the sig-
108. The anomalous facts of Halet limit its precedential value. First, the plaintiff 
fulfilled the state action requirement. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Second, 
by the time the court decided the case, Los Angeles had passed an anti-discrimination 
ordinance, which the owner chose to obey even though the apartment complex in which 
Halet resided was located outside the city limits. Nevertheless, rather than deem it moot, 
the court chose to decide the case because of the following: first, the owner could revert 
to an adults-only policy in the future, and failed to demonstrate that no reasonable ex-
pectation of such an occurrence existed. Second, whether the owner's new policy had 
completely eradicated the effect of its prior adults-only policy remained unclear. Halet v. 
Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d at 1307-08. 
109. 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984). 
110. Id. at 988. 
111. See supra note 13. 
112. O'Brien & Fitzgerald, supra note 3. 
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nificant features of these state statutes and discusses some of 
their strengths and weaknesses. 
The problem of tenant underutilization of the protections af-
forded by state statutes prohibiting child exclusion does not lie 
in the novelty of antidiscrimination measures; indeed, New 
.Jersey passed such an act in 1898. 118 States enacted the earliest 
of these laws at a time when landlords wielded even greater 
power than they do today,114 and when such laws provided ten-
ants with the only protection they had. The typical antidis-
crimination statute contains an initial flat prohibition against 
child exclusion, followed by a series of exceptions that permit 
discrimination under certain circumstances.1111 All of the stat-
utes, for example, allow elderly people to live in certain build-
ings or areas without children.116 Other exceptions permit child 
exclusion in one or two-family houses,117 owner-occupied 
houses, 118 and temporary leasing situations.119 Some states also 
allow restrictions on the number of children in multi-building 
housing complexes.120 
Yet the mere existence of these statutes has not resulted in 
their application. Indeed, little litigation appears to have oc-
curred in this field. m This inactivity could imply acquiescence 
by landlords to the dictates of the statutes or summary lower-
court affirmation of tenants' rights. Instead, one survey indicates 
that ignorance of such antidiscriminatory statutes may explain 
this inactivity.122 
113. L. 1898, c. 235, p. 794. 
114. Note, Housing Discrimination, supra note 3, at 570. 
115. See supra note 13. 
116. See supra note 13. 
117. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 46a-64a (West 1983). 
118. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64a (West 1983); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, 
§ 4(11) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-101 (West Supp. 
1984-1985); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). 
119. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(11) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984). 
120. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 363.02 (1984). 
121. A search on LEXIS, STATES library, using the statute numbers as search 
terms, discovered one case each in Arizona, Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 
747 (1974) (dealing with privately owned lots in a mobile home development); Connecti-
cut, Jones v. O'Connell, 189 Conn. 648, 652 n.l, 458 A.2d 355, 357 n.l (1983) (finding 
that the relevant statute did not apply retroactively); Illinois, Ill. Dep't of Human Rights 
v. Arlington Park Race Track Corp., 122 Ill. App. 3d 517,461 N.E.2d 505 (1984) (holding 
that a court did not have the power to enjoin a discriminatory practice directed against 
trainers living with their families in the barracks area of a race track); and New Jersey, 
Gilman v. Newark, 73 N.J. Super. 562, 180 A.2d 365 (1962) (holding that an ordinance 
prohibiting occupation of rooming houses by minors conflicted with state. statute). No 
cases were found in the other states. 
122. O'Brien & Fitzgerald, supra note 3 (reporting that a survey of Illinois district 
attorneys' offices discovered that many law enforcement officials were unaware that the 
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The laws prohibiting discrimination against children fall into 
three categories. One type gives the injured party a right of ac-
tion against the discriminating landlord. m A second type of 
statute merely makes it an "unfair practice" to discriminate and 
authorizes courts to fashion appropriate remedies. 124 The third 
group makes discrimination illegal and authorizes the use of 
criminal sanctions against those who discriminate. m 
Unfortunately, under the first two schemes these antidis-
crimination measures depend too heavily on the initiative of the 
injured parties and require familiarity with, as well as access to, 
the court system. Most potential plaintiffs need a home immedi-
ately and consequently have neither the time nor the resources 
to pursue a complaint. Furthermore, most people, including 
those connected with law enforcement agencies, do not know 
that these statutes exist. 128 
Problems exist even where the state bears the burden of en-
forcing criminal statutes. Although the threat of criminal prose-
cution clearly provides a deterrent, the imposition of such sanc-
tions presupposes adequate prosecutorial staffs and sufficient 
evidence to convict. The Illinois survey, however, indicates that 
prosecutors do not use these laws, 127 which suggests that these 
prerequisites do not always exist. 
Because it addresses these problems, the Massachusetts stat-
ute merits special attention. 128 Not only does it confer a private 
right of action on the party that allegedly suffered the wrong, it 
also provides an administrative remedy through the Common-
wealth Commission Against Discrimination. This agency serves 
several purposes and helps to eliminate a number of the 
problems found in other states' statutes. It can help disseminate 
information about the statute to the public and aid in its invoca-
tion.129 The agency can develop expertise in processing com-
statute existed). 
123. DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 25, § 6503 (Supp. 1982); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(11) 
(Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 236-237 (McKinney Supp. 
1983-1984). 
124. MINN. STAT. §§ 363.02-.03 (1984) . 
. 125. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 33-303, -1317 (Supp. 1984-1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 46a-64a (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-101 (West Supp. 1984-1985); N.Y. REAL 
PROP. LAW §§ 236-237 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). 
126. See O'Brien & Fitzgerald, supra note 3. 
127. Id. 
128. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, § 4(11) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984). 
129. A commission may have more success than an individual tenant in getting a 
landlord to comply with an antidiscrimination law. For example, a landlord may feel less 
confident that it could win a war of attrition against the commission. A landlord may 
also be unwilling to engender ill will in a commission that will review his actions for 
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plaints and reap the benefits of efficiencies obtained from han-
dling large numbers of claims instead of the infrequent 
complaints received by local prosecutors' offices throughout a 
state. 13° Consequently, any statute that seeks to remedy the 
problem of child exclusion should authorize a commission to en-
force its provisions. 
2. Judicial interpretation of state civil rights statutes-
Many states that do not have statutes explicitly forbidding the 
exclusion of children in housing do have general civil rights stat-
utes that courts could use to prohibit child exclusion.181 So far, 
however, only two state courts have applied their civil rights 
statutes to the question of exclusionary practices, and they have 
come to opposite conclusions. Because these statutes appear on 
the surface to contain no significant differences, these two con-
flicting cases offer no conclusive resolution of this issue. In fact, 
each case has raised further questions. 
In Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson,182 the California Supreme 
Court applied the Unruh Civil Rights Act188 to a situation where 
a landlord attempted to evict a family from an adults-only 
apartment complex after the birth of their son. The court held 
that the Act prohibited discrimination on the basis of age, even 
though the Act did not enumerate age as a protected classifica-
tion.184 To reach its holding, the court found that the legislature 
had intended the list of protected classes to be read 
years to come. The success and ease with which the Massachusetts commission has han-
dled claims, see infra note 130, supports this position. 
130. See O'Brien & Fitzgerald, supra note 3. 
The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination indicates that it is able to deal 
with most problems with a simple telephone conversation with the landlord, and that the 
threat of legal action is usually sufficient to stop attempted discrimination. (Telephone 
interview with Leslie Greer of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination 
(Feb. 28, 1985).) 
131. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.210 (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (1976); 
Kv. REV. STAT. § 344.120 (Supp. 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 20 (Supp. 1984); Mo. 
ANN. STAT. § 213.105 (Vernon Supp. 1985); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 49-2-305 (Supp. 
1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-107 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8V(a) (1984); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS§ 34-37-4 (Supp. 1984); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 20-13-21(1) (Supp. 1984); VA. 
CoDE § 36-88 (1984); W. VA. CoDE § 5-11-9(g) (Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.22 
(West Supp. 1984-85). 
132. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 
(1982). 
133. Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE§ 51 (West 1982): 
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter 
what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to 
the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges or services 
in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. 
134. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 724-25, 640 P.2d 115, 117, 180 
Cal. Rptr. 496, 498, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). 
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expansively. 136 
California courts have reached the same result when interpret-
ing the Unruh Act in different contexts. The same year it de-
cided Marina Point the California Supreme Court heard a simi-
lar case involving a condominium138 and found that the Act 
prohibited the builder of the condominium and the association 
which administered it from discriminating against families with 
children. In 1984 a California appellate court ruled on a similar 
issue,137 this time allowing a family with a child to remain in its 
mobile home despite a park rule prohibiting children. 
In spite of the holdings, political forces appear to have under-
mined these decisions.138 The Department of Fair Employment 
and Housing, the department empowered to hear complaints of 
violations of the California civil rights act, has only recently 
agreed to take complaints from individuals alleging exclusion be-
cause of children. 139 Just as with statutes that explicitly forbid 
discrimination against children in housing, 140 a legal rule will not 
achieve its intended purpose unless law enforcers use the rule. 
Like the California Supreme Court, the Michigan Supreme 
Court, in Michigan Department of Civil Rights v. Beznos 
Corp., 141 has applied its civil rights statute142 to a landlord's dis-
crimination against a family with children. The case involved 
the owner of two suburban Detroit apartment complexes who 
.permitted families with children to rent in only one part of one 
complex yet allowed tenants without children to rent an apart-
ment in any part of either complex. 143 Unlike its California 
135. Id. 
136. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. 
Rptr. 320 (1982). 
137. Adamson Cos. v. Zipp, 163 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 210 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1984). 
138. Telephone interviews with Jim Morales, Nat'! Center for Youth Law, San Fran-
cisco (Oct. 2, 1984; Feb. 28, 1985). 
139. Id. 
140. See supra notes 111-130 and accompanying text. 
141. 421 Mich. 110, 365 N.W.2d 82 (1984). 
142. Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37.2101-.2804 (1979); MicH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2102(1) (West Supp. 1984-85) reads: 
The opportunity to obtain . . . housing and other real estate . . . without dis-
crimination because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, 
weight, or marital status as prohibited by this act, is recognized and declared to 
be a civil right (emphasis added). 
143. The apartment owner appealed the initial ruling against it by the State Civil 
Rights Commission to the circuit court, which ruled on the stipulated question, whether 
"the owner of a multi-family apartment complex (may) lawfully restrict families with 
children to certain designated buildings." Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., 
Oakland County Circuit Court No. 80-202870-CZ (Mich. 1981). The circuit court ruled 
that the action specified in the stipulated question was "not ... per se violative ... if 
[it] is taken by the landlord in the interest of the comfort and safety of all the tenants." 
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counterpart, the Michigan Supreme Court did not rely on legis-
lative intent but on precedent144 to argue that an expansive 
reading of the statute would prevent the state from enforcing 
"'regulations, rules, laws and policies designed to protect chil-
dren.' "HCI By this it meant that to prohibit a landlord absolutely 
from discriminating on the basis of age would force landlords to 
rent to minors acting alone. 148 Because "the civil rights act does 
not prohibit differential treatment of minors per se where such 
treatment is reasonably necessitated by the special nature and 
characteristics of children,"147 the court rejected a broad inter-
pretation of the Act. 
The court explicitly stopped short, however, of deciding what 
restrictions a landlord could impose on families with children.148 
This reticence prompted a dissenting justice to maintain that 
the court's ruling decided nothing and that, because it had no 
relation to the facts of the case, it represented, in substance, an 
unauthorized advisory opinion. 149 The Michigan Supreme 
Id. The Department of Civil Rights appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed the lower court's decision. Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., 125 
Mich. App. 500, 336 N.W.2d 494 (1983). In its opinion, however, the court of appeals 
answered a broader question than the one stipulated to by the parties, finding that the 
Civil Rights Act "prohibits discrimination on the basis of chronological age in real estate 
transactions but makes no mention of disparate treatment of families with children." Id. 
at 503, 336 N.W.2d at 495. Citing increased economic burdens that would fall on land-
lords, as well as the annoyance to tenants desiring to live apart from children, the court 
"decline[d] to infer a broad legislative intention to require that all apartments be made 
available to children." Id. at 505, 336 N.W.2d at 496. The court of appeals thus left the 
way open for landlords not merely to segregate children to one portion of a complex, but 
even to exclude children completely if the landlord's economic interests or tenants' 
wishes seemed to make such a step expedient. 
One dissenting judge compared the Beznos case to United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 
789 (5th Cir. 1978), in which the Fifth Circuit held that the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604 (1982), prevented a landlord from steering black tenants to one area of an apart-
ment complex. The judge argued that the more explicit Michigan statute, which includes 
age, a category not mentioned in the federal statute, must preclude both the narrow 
restriction of families to particular buildings as well as the broader restriction, the com-
plete exclusion, which the majority decision suggested might be permissible. Mich. Dep't 
of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., 125 Mich. App. 500, 507-10, 336 N.W.2d 494, 497-98 
(1983) (Mackenzie, J., dissenting). 
144. Cheeseman v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 108 Mich. App. 428, 310 N.W.2d 
408 (1981) (holding that steps taken by movie theaters to prevent children under acer-
tain age from attending R-rated films did not violate the civil rights act). 
145. Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., 421 Mich. 110, 119-20, 365 N.W.2d 
82, 87 (1984) (quoting Cheeseman v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 108 Mich. App. 428, 
433, 310 N.W.2d 408, 411 (1981)). 
146. Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., 421 Mich. 110, 120, 365 N.W.2d 82, 
87 (1984). 
147. Id. at 121, 365 N.W.2d at 88 (1984). 
148. Id. at 118, 365 N.W.2d at 86 (1984). 
149. Id. at 123, 365 N.W.2d at 88-89 (1984) (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
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Court's majority opinion suggests that the plaintiff, the Depart-
ment of Civil Rights, chose to ask the wrong question. 150 Be-
cause the plaintiff stipulated too narrow a question, one can pre-
dict a spate of other challenges to landlords' actions as tenants 
attempt to determine exactly what the civil rights act allows 
their landlords to do. 
The experiences of Michigan and California thus demonstrate 
the uncertainty that results from applying civil rights statutes to 
the problem of exclusionary policies. Moreover, Marina Point 
took five years to go from injury to final decision-six if one 
counts the United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari. 151 
Similarly, Beznos has taken seven years to reach a conclusion on 
an extremely technical point. 152 Neither case has definitively 
ruled on all types of housing. In such a volatile area of law, ap-
plication of state civil rights statutes provides an unsatisfactory 
remedy. 153 
IV. CONCLUSION AND MODEL STATUTE 
The exclusion of children from housing poses a serious prob-
lem. The best evidence suggests that as many as one-half of all 
families seeking rental housing have encountered difficulties be-
cause of child-exclusion policies and that more and more land-
lords are adopting these policies. Moreover, the problem of ex-
clusionary policies has spilled over into other types of housing. 
Consequently, residents of condominiums, mobile home parks, 
and even private homes find themselves confronted with obsta-
cles to acquiring property or continuing to live in their homes. 
Unfortunately, existing statutes have proved ineffective in 
prohibiting this discrimination. To cure these deficiencies, this 
Note. proposes a model statute that combines the best features 
of the current statutes with provisions addressing new concerns. 
While retaining exceptions for valid interests, such as those of 
the elderly, the model statute would directly prohibit discrimi-
nation against children in all forms of housing and would estab-
150. Id. at 117-18, 365 N.W.2d at 86 (1984). 
151. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). 
152. Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., 421 Mich. 110, 365 N.W.2d 82 
(1984). 
153. Note, O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n: Winning the War Against Age 
Restrictive Covenants But Using the Unruh Act Cannon as a Pea Shooter, 20 CAL. W.L. 
REV. 109 (1983). 
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lish a commission to enforce its provisions. In this way it seeks 
to accommodate the legitimate interests of all parties and to as-
sure adequate and affordable housing to families with children. 
MODEL STATUTE 
SECTION 1: DEFINITIONS 
In this Act: 
(a) "Apartment" means a self-contained dwel-
ling unit containing cooking facilities. 
(b) "Apartment complex" means a group of 
buildings each containing four or more 
apartments on a contiguous parcel of land 
owned by the same person. 
(c) "Child" means any individual under eigh-
teen years of age. 
(d) "Condominium" means an estate in real 
property consisting of an undivided inter-
est in common in a portion of a parcel of 
real property together with a separate in-
terest in space in a residential building. 
( e) "Elderly person" means a person over sixty 
years of age. 
(f) "Family" means two or more individuals re-
lated by blood, adoption, or marriage. 
(g) "Infirm person" means an individual with a 
chronic, debilitating disability. 
(h) "Mobile home" means a movable or porta-
ble unit, designed and constructed to be 
towed on its own chassis ( comprising frame 
and wheels), and designed to be connected 
to utilities for year-round occupancy. 
(i) "Private home" means a single-family or 
two-family dwelling in which the owner 
maintains a residence for himself or herself 
and for the members of his or her family. 
(j) "Rental housing" means a house, mobile 
home, condominium, or apartment rented 
with or without a lease by a landlord to a 
tenant. 
SUMMER 1985] Exclusion of Families 1147 
(k) "Tenant" means an individual living in 
rental housing; it is not limited to the indi-
vidual(s) signing a lease. 
SECTION 2: PROHIBITION OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
CHILDREN IN RENTAL 
HOUSING 
(a) Except as provided in Section 3, it is unlaw-
ful for a landlord to refuse to rent a hous-
ing unit to an individual because of the 
presence of children in the prospective ten-
ant's family or because of the pregnancy of 
a prospective woman tenant. 
(b) It is unlawful for a landlord to terminate a 
lease, evict a tenant, or refuse to renew an 
existing lease because of the presence of 
children in the tenant's family or because 
of the pregnancy of a woman tenant. 
( c) It is unlawful to advertise rental housing or 
to accept an advertisement for rental hous-
ing if the advertisement contains any re-
striction against renting to a family be-
cause of children in the prospective 
tenant's family or because of the pregnancy 
of a prospective woman tenant. 
(d) It is unlawful to demand or receive a 
greater sum as rent for the use and occu-
pancy of any premises because of children 
in the family of the tenant or because of the 
pregnancy of a woman tenant. 
SECTION 3: EXCEPTIONS 
Notwithstanding the prohibitions listed in Sec-
tion 2, the following situations are not unlawful: 
(a) This Act does not affect any local, state or 
federal restrictions regarding the maxi-
mum number of occupants permitted to oc-
cupy a dwelling unit. 
(b) This Act does not apply to an owner-occu-
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pied dwelling of four or fewer apartments, 
one of which is occupied by the owner. 
( c) This Act does not apply to any apartment 
house or apartment complex for which the 
owner has applied for a waiver and for 
which the waiver has been granted by the 
state commission for civil rights. The 
waiver may apply to: 
(1) any apartment house in which a ma-
jority of the inhabitants are elderly or 
infirm or both; 
(2) any single apartment house in which 
all current inhabitants have joined in 
a petition requesting the landlord to 
exclude families with children. 
In either case (1) or (2) above, renting to a 
family that has children currently living 
with it shall act as notice to the landlord 
that the waiver is terminated. 
In case (2) above, each new tenant must 
agree to the conditions of the waiver in or-
der for the waiver to continue to be valid. 
(d) In the case of apartment complexes con-
taining one hundred or more apartments, if 
the number of children living in the com-
plex is equal to or greater than sixty-five 
percent of the number of apartments in the 
complex, and if the structure of the build-
ings and/or the complex is such that fami-
lies with children may be restricted to spe-
cific types of apartments or buildings, then 
this Act does not apply. 
(e) In the case of apartment complexes, it is 
not unlawful for a landlord to restrict chil-
dren to specific types of apartments or 
buildings if there is a rational reason for 
doing so. Nevertheless, a landlord may not 
refuse to rent an apartment in a substan-
tially similar building to a family unless the 
waiver provision in (c)(2) has been fulfilled. 
(f) This Act does not apply to the temporary 
sub-leasing or assignment of an apartment 
by the principal lessee. 
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SECTION 4: PROHIBITION OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
CHILDREN IN OWNED 
HOUSING 
Except as provided in Part 5, 
1149 
(a) It is unlawful for the owner of any condo-
minium, mobile home, or private home to 
refuse to sell such condominium, mobile 
home, or private home to any prospective 
buyer because of the presence of children 
in the buyer's family, or because the buyer 
or a member of the buyer's family is 
pregnant. 
(b) It is unlawful for any association or organi-
zation representing the owners of any con-
dominiums, mobile homes, or private 
homes, or for the owners of the land on 
which such condominiums, mobile homes, or 
private homes are located, 
( 1) to refuse to sell any such condomin-
ium, mobile home, or private home; or 
(2) to refuse to approve the sale of any 
such condominium, mobile home, or 
private home, or 
(3) to interfere in any way with the sale 
of any such condominium, mobile 
home, or private home 
because of the presence of children in the 
buyer's family or because the buyer or a 
member of the buyer's family is pregnant. 
SECTION 5: EXCEPTIONS 
Notwithstanding the prohibitions listed in Sec-
tion 4, the following situations are not unlawful: 
(a) This Act does not affect any local, state, or 
federal restrictions regarding the maxi-
mum number of occupants permitted to oc-
cupy a dwelling unit. 
(b) This Act does not apply to any dwelling 
unit for which the owner has applied for a 
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waiver and for which the waiver has been 
accepted by the state commission for civil 
rights. The waiver may apply to: 
(1) Any condominium complex in which a 
majority of the inhabitants are elderly 
or infirm or both, and which has been 
designed specifically for occupancy by 
such individuals. 
(2) Any condominium complex, mobile 
home park, or subdivision in which all 
current inhabitants have joined in a 
petition requesting the owners' asso-
ciation to exclude families with 
children. 
In either case (1) or (2) above, sale of a unit 
to a family with children must be approved 
by two-thirds of the current residents of 
the condominium complex, mobile home 
park, or subdivision. Such a sale will re-
move the condominium complex, mobile 
home park, or subdivision from the protec-
tion of this section. 
In case (2) above, each new buyer must 
agree to the conditions of the waiver in or-
der for the waiver to continue to be valid. 
Refusal to sign the petition shall be 
grounds for the sale not to be approved. 
(c) In the case of condominium complexes con-
taining one hundred or more units, or of 
mobile home parks covering thirty or more 
acres, it is not unlawful for the managing 
association to restrict families with chil-
dren to one building or group of buildings, 
or to one geographical area, provided there 
is a rational reason for doing so. 
SECTION 6: REMEDIES 
Any person who feels injured by the violation of 
a provision of Section 1 or Section 4 has the 
right to complain to the state commission for 
civil rights, which is designated to petition for 
relief in any court of competent jurisdiction. If 
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the commission fails to find a violation within 
twenty days, the person alleging injury has the 
right to petition for relief in any court of compe• 
tent jurisdiction. 
If a court determines that a person was injured 
by a violation of this Act, damages are limited to 
the cost of replacement housing during the time 
that the party suft"ered injury. 
-George Palmer Schober 
